Towards Refinement and Generalization of Reliability Models Based on
  Component States by Jarus, Natasha et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
04
02
7v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  9
 O
ct 
20
19
1
Towards Refinement and Generalization of
Reliability Models Based on Component States
Natasha Jarus, Sahra Sedigh Sarvestani, and Ali R. Hurson
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
Rolla, MO 65409, USA
Email: {jarus, sedighs, hurson}@mst.edu
Abstract—Complex system design often proceeds in an iterative
fashion, starting from a high-level model and adding detail as
the design matures. This process can be assisted by metamod-
eling techniques that automate some model manipulations and
check for or eliminate modeling mistakes. Our work focuses on
metamodeling reliability models: we describe generalization and
refinement operations for these models. Generalization relaxes
constraints that may be infeasible or costly to evaluate; refine-
ment adds further detail to produce a model that more closely
describes the desired system. We define these operations in terms
of operations on system constraints. To illustrate the proposed
method, we relate these constraints to a common Markov chain-
based reliability modeling formalism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designers of critical complex systems—such as autonomous
vehicles, power grids, or water distribution networks—must
ensure their systems can dependably meet performance re-
quirements. Dependability encompasses a variety of system
metrics that describe the ability of a system to continue to
provide service as its components degrade. Among the most
common of these metrics is reliability: the probability that a
system remains functional up to time t. Reliability takes a
binary view of system function: components, and the system,
are either functional or failed. Reliability models based on
component states compute a system’s reliability as a function
of the reliabilities of its components. This function is deter-
mined by the structure of the system—how its components
are connected. For example, a power grid consisting of two
transmission lines in parallel is more reliable than the system
with the same lines connected in series.
Complex systems are often designed iteratively. Require-
ments are gathered and an initial design is prepared, modeled,
and analyzed. Based on the results, the design is modified to
better fit the requirements (or the requirements are modified so
the design can better fit them) and the process repeats. Initial
designs and models may be quite general; but they become
more detailed as the design progresses. As the design process
can have many iterations, metamodeling approaches, which
model operations applied to models, are often used to reduce
the labor involved, eliminate certain modeling mistakes, and
even to help explore the design space.
When modifying a model, we typically want to either add
more detail—a new component, a stronger constraint on how
that component behaves—or we want to remove a constraint
that is unrealistic or would render the design infeasible. The
first action we call refinement and the second generalization.
Refinement can be used to fill out detail in a high-level model
that meets design requirements; generalization can be used to
“back out” of a design choice that isn’t working. Both can
be used together to explore the design space—refinement asks
“what is the smallest detail that could be added to this model?”;
generalization asks “what happens if this detail is removed?”
It is our goal to make these actions explicit and exact, enabling
further analysis and software automation.
In this work, we propose a method for generalization and
refinement of Markov Imbeddable Structure (MIS) reliability
models where system-level states are identified based on
component-level states. The initial state is one where every
component is functional; the terminal state is one where
enough components have failed to cause system failure, and
intermediate states correspond to the system remaining func-
tional despite some the failure of some of its components.
These models describe a system composed of n components
as a Markov chain, encoding each component’s reliability and
the effect of its failure on other components. The reliability
of the system is then the probability that the system remains
functional after taking n steps through the Markov chain. Our
work focuses on MIS models where the states of the Markov
chain are defined by component status (e.g., “component 3
failed” or “only component 2 functional”) and where the
component status described by a state remains the same
regardless of which component’s failure is being considered.
This encompasses the vast majority of MIS models, especially
as used in practice; however, it does not encompass certain
unusual MIS models, such as models of consecutive-k-of-n
systems.1 These we will address in future work.
When formalizing generalization and refinement, we should
consider system properties that are preserved by these opera-
tions. Roughly speaking, if the model mr is a refinement of
a model mg , the constraints imposed on the system by mr
should imply the constraints imposed by mg. For example,
if mr requires a component c to have reliability ≥ 0.9, mg
can require that c have reliability ≥ 0.7—this constraint is
1In short, the transition probability matrices for consecutive-k-of-n systems
are not upper triangular; for more detail, see [1, pp. 344–345].
2strictly weaker than the constraint of mr. However, mg could
not require c to have reliability ≥ 0.99. In other words, a
system meeting the requirements of mr would provide equal
or better reliability than a system meeting mg’s requirements
alone. If mr refines mg, then mg generalizes mr, so we
can use the same implication relationship to describe both
refinement and generalization. We formally abstract system
properties and implication to analyze the soundness of our
definitions of generalization and refinement.
Another advantage of describing refinement and general-
ization in this fashion is that it can be used for model-to-
model transformations as shown in our previous work [2].
Provided another formalism represents some of the same
system properties, we can relate these MIS models to this
formalism in a way that lets us soundly convert between
the two. Thus, the effort required to develop this formalism
enables more than the single application this work discusses.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section II provides
a summary of the theory behind our approach. System con-
straints, generalization, and refinement are defined in Sec-
tion III. These operations are connected to MIS models in
Section IV. Finally, related work is surveyed in Section V and
Section VI presents our conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
The central theory that underlies the work in this paper has
been articulated in our previous work [2]. Here we recap the
results in terms of the goals of this paper.
Our goal is to relate two domains—a domain of MIS models
and a domain of system properties—so that if a certain set
of properties describe a given system, the model generated
from those properties also describes the system. Likewise, if a
model describes a system, the properties generated from that
model also describe the system. We use this relationship to
define generalization and refinement on MIS models based on
generalization and refinement of properties.
For our approach, the domains must both be complete
lattices L , (L,⊑,
⊔
,
d
,⊥,⊤). Recall that ⊑ is a partial
order relation; for any subset L′ ⊆ L,
⊔
L′ is the least upper
bound (join) and
d
L′ the greatest lower bound (meet) of L′;
and ⊥ and ⊤ are the least and greatest elements of the lattice.
For L′ = {l1, l2}, we write
d
L′ as l1⊓ l2 and
⊔
L′ as l1⊔ l2.
Suppose we have a complete system properties lattice
Prop , (Prop,⇒,
∨
,
∧
,⊥P ,⊤P ) (see Sec. III) and a com-
plete MIS model lattice MIS , (MIS,⊑,
⊔
,
d
,⊥M ,⊤M )
(see Sec. IV). We order both domains by specificity. Intu-
itively, properties p1 are more specific than properties p2 (i.e.,
p1 ⊑ p2) if p1 provides additional information about the
system that p2 does not. Likewise with models: if m1 ⊑ m2,
m1 may offer more detail about the system; for example, m1
may divide a component in m2 into several components with
a more complex interrelationship. The meet of two properties
p1 ⊓ p2 is their logical conjunction; the join p1 ⊔ p2 is their
disjunction. We will discuss both of these domains in more
detail later in the paper.
We use a Galois connection to soundly relate elements of
these two domains. A Galois connection between complete
lattices is a pair of functions α and γ with properties similar to,
but less strict than, those of an order isomorphism. Informally,
Galois connections allow one of the lattices to have “more
detail” than the other; they are often used in cases where one
lattice is an abstraction of the other.
Definition II.1. A Galois connection (P, α, γ,M) between
complete lattices P and M is a pair of functions α : P → M
and γ : M → P such that
(i) ∀p ∈ P, p ⊑ (γ ◦ α)(p) and
(ii) ∀m ∈ M, (α ◦ γ)(m) ⊑ m.
α is called the abstraction function (or abstraction opera-
tor); γ is called the concretization function (operator).
Given a Galois connection (Prop, α, γ,MIS), what do
properties II.1.(i) and II.1.(ii) mean in terms of system prop-
erties and MIS models? Property II.1.(i) states that for every
collection of properties p, p ⇒ (γ ◦ α)(p): if we abstract a
model from p, then concretize properties from that model; the
result is at worst more general than the properties with which
we began. Likewise, property II.1.(ii) states that for every MIS
modelm, (α◦γ)(m) ⊑ m. Thus, concretizing properties from
an MIS model, then abstracting a model from those properties,
produces at worst a model more specific than the initial model.
(It is often the case that the ⊑ in II.1.(ii) is equality.)
What remains is to relate our domains and the Galois
connection between them to a notion of soundness. Soundness
is a relative property; whether a model or a collection of
properties is sound or not depends on the system being
modeled. Let S ∈ Sys denote the system we are modeling.
We encode soundness by a relation:
Definition II.2. A relation RL : Sys → L between systems
and elements of a lattice L is a soundness relation if
(i) if S RL l1 and l1 ⊑ l2, then S RL l2 and
(ii) if L′ ⊆ L and ∀l ∈ L′,S RLl, then S RL
d
L′.
We suppose that we have a soundness relation RP : Sys→
Prop such that S RP p if and only if the properties in p
describe S. Every generalization of a correct collection of
properties is sound by property II.2.(i). Not every refinement
of a collection of properties is necessarily sound—otherwise,
every property would be sound for every system. However, if
we know several sound properties, property II.2.(ii) states that
they can be refined to a single sound property that implies all
known sound properties.
Given the soundness relationRP, we can induce a soundness
relation RM : Sys → MIS by S RM m ⇐⇒ S RP γ(m).
Therefore, if properties pr soundly refine pg , then α(pr)
soundly refines α(pg). In short, we need only consider the
soundness of refinements in Prop; the soundness of our MIS
models follows.
III. PROPERTIES
Before we describe refinement and generalization of MIS
models, we formalize the constraints they place on system
design. The MIS models we consider in this work place three
broad constraints on a system: what components are in the
system, how reliable each component is, and which compo-
nents depend on others to remain functional. The properties
3domain Prop defines these as a lattice, allowing us to relate
these properties to MIS models.
As we will need some way to identify components, let
Comps , {c1, c2, . . . } be the set of all possible component
names.
Each element p ∈ Prop is a triplet p = (C,R,D) where
• C ⊆ Comps is the finite set of names of components
in the system (e.g., {c1, c2, c3});
• R : C→ [0, 1] is a function that specifies a lower bound
for the reliability of each component: if the reliability of
c is p, then R(c) ≤ p; and
• D ⊆ Deps is the finite set of component dependencies,
as described in the next section.
For example, a system consisting of two 90% reliable power
lines in parallel where the failure of one causes the other to
become overloaded and thus fail as well would be described
by the properties (C = {c1, c2},R(c1) = R(c2) = 0.9,D =
{〈c1  c2,S〉, 〈c2  c1,S〉}).
A. Dependencies
Component dependencies (elements of Deps) are repre-
sented by the relation 〈_  _〉 : P(C) → P(C ∪ {S}).2
The statement 〈· · ·1  · · ·2〉 means “the failure of the
components in the set · · ·1 immediately leads to the failure of
the components in · · ·2”. Should S appear in · · ·2, the system
also fails as a result of the components of · · ·1 failing. The
components on the left side (· · ·1) are referred to as causes
and the components on the right (· · ·2) as effects.
These dependencies correspond to state transitions. Suppose
we have a system with components C = {c1, c2, c3}. We
can represent the state of the components as three-bit strings:
111 corresponds to the system state where all components
are functional, 101 corresponds to the state where c2 has
failed, etc. A dependency 〈c1  ∅〉 corresponds to a transition
from 111 to 011 when c1 fails—the failure of c1 does
not influence the functionality of other components in the
system. Likewise, a dependency 〈c1, c2  c3,S〉 corresponds
to transitions from 101 to 000 when c1 fails and from 011
to 000 when c2 fails; furthermore, in state 000 the system
is considered failed. Sec. IV formalizes this correspondence.
As there are a number of ways to write dependencies, we
place some constraints on them to ensure the constraints on
the system are consistent with how components fail and fully
cover all cases of system behavior. These constraints are split
into equivalences and well-formedness (WF) properties.
1) Equivalences: The first equivalence rule states that if a
component appears on both sides of , we can remove it from
the right side. The failure of any component trivially causes
that component to fail; this rule states that we need not write
this fact explicitly:3
〈c · · ·1  c · · ·2〉 ≡ 〈c · · ·1  · · ·2〉. (Tautology)
The remaining two equivalences are between sets of depen-
dencies, rather than between two individual dependencies. If
2P(S) denotes the set of subsets (“powerset”) of the set S.
3A note on notation: c · · ·1 refers to a set containing the component c and
the components of the set · · ·1.
we have two dependencies with the same cause but different
effects, we can produce one dependency that represents both
by taking the union of their effects:{
〈· · ·1  · · ·2〉
〈· · ·1  · · ·3〉
}
≡ {〈· · ·1  · · ·2 · · ·3〉} . (Union)
Finally, a dependency with no causes cannot occur:
{〈∅ · · ·〉} ≡ ∅. (Inaction)
2) Well-formedness Properties: The WF properties describe
a system-level view of dependencies: what dependencies need
to be present in D to make a consistent set of system
constraints. First, every component must have a dependency
where it is the sole cause of failure (although the effect may
be the empty set). These correspond to transitions from the
initial 1 · · · 1 state:
∀c ∈ C, ∃〈c · · ·〉 ∈ D. (Initiality)
In addition, at least one sequence of failures must lead to
the system failing (otherwise, the system’s reliability would
be 1 and there would be nothing to model):
∃〈· · ·1  S · · ·2〉 ∈ D. (Termination)
Finally, components cannot recover as a result of the failure
of other components. Thus, if components · · ·1 cause compo-
nents · · ·2 to fail, any other dependency where · · ·1 have failed
must also have · · ·2 failed.
∀〈· · ·1  · · ·2〉 ∈ D,
∀〈· · ·1 · · ·3  · · ·4〉 ∈ D,
· · ·2 ⊆ · · ·3 ∪ · · ·4 .
(Monotonicity)
For instance, if we have 〈c1  c2〉, Monotonicity would
permit the dependencies 〈c1, c3  c2〉 and 〈c1, c2  c3〉 but
forbid 〈c1, c3  ∅〉, as c2 must always fail when c1 fails.
3) Examples: Before addressing generalization and refine-
ment of properties, we demonstrate a few examples of how de-
pendencies are used to specify system behavior. First, consider
the dependencies in the earlier parallel-component example:
D = {〈c1  c2,S〉, 〈c2  c1,S〉}. In this system, the failure
of component c1 leads to the failure of c2 and system failure,
and vice versa for c2. This system has two states, 11 and
00 ; the failure of either component causes a transition from
the first to the second.
By contrast, a parallel-component system where the two
components are independent would be specified by D =
{〈c1  ∅〉, 〈c2  ∅〉, 〈c1, c2  S〉}. This system has all
four possible states and all valid transitions between states.
A system with two components in series produces a more
interesting “failed” state. These components are independent,
as one failing does not cause the other to fail, but both need
to be functional for the system to function: D = {〈c1  
S〉, 〈c2  S〉}.This system also has two states: the initial
state 11 and the failed superstate 01 10 .4 Once the system
has failed, we are no longer interested in its behavior; thus,
for this system, we consider 00 unreachable.
4MIS modeling requires a single “failed” system (super)state; we leave
unification of functional states into superstates for future work.
4B. Generalization
Now that we have described the elements of Prop, we can
describe how to generalize them. The goal of generalizing an
element of Prop is to produce an element of Prop that relaxes
the constraints of the first element but does not contradict it.
Understanding how constraints can be generalized allows us
to order Prop by generalization.
1) One-step generalizations of dependencies: For a given
reliability model, one way to generalize dependencies is to
lower the constraint on a component’s reliability: a more
reliable component can always be substituted for a less reliable
one. We can relax the reliability of a component, c, to a lower
constraint r < R(c) by
relax_rel(C,R,D)[_, _] : C→ [0, 1]→ Prop
relax_rel(C,R,D)[c, r] , (C,R
′,D) (1)
where
R′(c′) ,
{
r if c = c′
R(c) otherwise.
(1.1)
The other means of generalizing system constraints is to
generalize component dependencies. We begin by considering
the smallest actions we can take that generalize system de-
pendencies while maintaining the WF properties. There are
two possible operations: merging two components and adding
a new dependency 〈· · ·  c〉 among existing components.
Both of these operations take one element of Prop and infer
another.
Two distinct components c1 and c2 can be merged into a
single component cm (where the name cm does not already
appear in C \ {c1, c2}) by replacing every instance of c1 and
c2 with cm:
merge(C,R,D)[_, _→ _] : C→ C→ Comps→ Prop
merge(C,R,D)[c1, c2 → cm] , (C
′,R′,D′) (2)
where
C′ , {cm} ∪C \ {c1, c2} (2.1)
R′(c) ,
{
min(R(c1),R(c2)) if c = cm,
R(c) otherwise.
(2.2)
D′ , {〈m(c) m(e)〉 | 〈c e〉 ∈ D} (2.3)
m(c) ,
{
{cm} ∪ c \ {c1, c2} if c1 ∈ c ∨ c2 ∈ c,
c otherwise.
(2.4)
When defining a generalization, we should ensure that it
only relaxes constraints. Thus, when choosing the reliability
bound R′(cm) of the merged component, we must pick the
least restrictive choice min(R(c1),R(c2)). Effectively, this
choice performs two generalizations: first, we relax the tighter
of the reliability bounds of c1 and c2 by setting R(c1) = R(c2),
then we merge c1 and c2 into one component.
The other possible generalization is adding a dependency
among existing components. This may seem counterintuitive;
however, it is a stronger claim to say that a component is
independent of another—the fewer dependencies a system has,
the more reliable it is. Adding a dependency from a nonempty
set of components c to a component e /∈ c means that
whenever the components in c cause a failure, e is amongst
the effects. As all the components in c and e are in C already,
we need only modify the dependencies:
add_dep(C,R,D)[_ _] : P(C)→ C→ Prop
add_dep(C,R,D)[c e] , (C,R,D
′) (3)
where
D′ , {a(〈c′  e′〉) | 〈c′  e′〉 ∈ D} (3.1)
∪ {〈c u ∪ {e}〉}
a(〈c′  e′〉) ,
{
〈c′ \ {e} e′ ∪ {e}〉 if c ⊆ c′,
〈c′  e′〉 otherwise.
(3.2)
u ,
⋃
{e′ | 〈c′  e′〉 ∈ D where c′ ⊆ c}
(3.3)
For an example of the effect of generalization operations
on a system, consider a system with three independent com-
ponents:
p = (C = {c1, c2, c3},R(_) = 0.9,D = {
〈c1  ∅〉, 〈c2  ∅〉, 〈c3  ∅〉,
〈c1, c2, c3  S〉
})
Introducing a dependency 〈c1, c2  c3〉 results in the
following system:
p′ = add_depp[c1, c2  c3]
= (C′ = {c1, c2, c3},R
′(_) = 0.9,D′ = {
〈c1  ∅〉, 〈c2  ∅〉, 〈c3  ∅〉,
〈c1, c2  c3〉
†,
〈c1, c2  c3,S〉
‡
}
≡ 〈c1, c2  c3,S〉
})
Of note: the dependency marked † is the new dependency
added by add_dep and the dependency marked ‡ is the result
of the first substitution rule in (3.2). Both rules reduce to one
via the Union property.
2) Multi-step generalization of dependencies: The exam-
ple of the previous section illustrates the process by which
successive generalization steps are applied to system prop-
erties. To describe this more formally, let G be the set of
all generalization operations and G∗ be the set of finite
sequences of elements of G. We define the act of applying
a sequence of generalizations to an element of properties,
J_K(_) : G∗ → Prop→ Prop, by
JgK(p) ,
{
p if g = ()
JgsK(g′p) if g = (g′, gs).
(4)
With the ability to apply a sequence of generalizations, we
now turn to the task of ordering elements of Prop.
53) Generalization as a partial order: To form a partial
order on Prop using these generalization operations, we
say that if pg generalizes pr, there exists some sequence of
generalizations that witnesses that fact:
Definition III.1. pg =∈ Prop generalizes pr ∈ Prop, written
pr ⊑ pg , if ∃g ∈ G∗, JgK(pr) = pg.
Theorem III.1. ⊑ forms a partial order on Prop.
C. Refinement
In addition to generalization of constraints, we are interested
in refining them: adding new constraints or increasing the
strictness of existing ones. Refinements are dual to general-
izations, so for each generalization we expect a corresponding
refinement.
1) One-step Refinements: Corresponding to relax_rel we
have tighten_rel which raises the bound on the reliability of
component c to a higher constraint r > R(c):
tighten_rel(C,R,D)[_, _] : C→ [0, 1]→ Prop
tighten_rel(C,R,D)[c, r] , (C,R
′,D) (5)
where
R′(c′) ,
{
r if c = c′
R(c′) otherwise
(5.1)
To undo a merge, we split one component, cm, into two,
c1 and c2 (where c1, c2 /∈ C \ {c}). When splitting two
components, we make each fully dependent on the other, as
that is the most general set of constraints we can generate. In
other words, the result of splitp[cm → c1, c2] is the maximal
element of the set {q ∈ Prop | p = mergeq[c1, c2 → cm]}.
split(C,R,D)[_→ _, _] : C→ Comps→ Comps→ Prop
split(C,R,D)[cm → c1, c2] , (C
′,R′,D′) (6)
where
C′ , {c1, c2} ∪C \ {cm} (6.1)
R′(c) ,
{
R(cm) if c = c1 ∨ c = c2,
R(c) otherwise.
(6.2)
D′ ,
⋃
{s(〈c e〉) | 〈c e〉 ∈ D} (6.3)
s(〈c e〉) ,




〈{c1, c2} ∪ c
′  e〉
〈{c1} ∪ c
′  e ∪ {c2}〉
〈{c2} ∪ c
′  e ∪ {c1}〉

 if cm ∈ c

〈c e′ ∪ {c1, c2}〉
〈c e′ ∪ {c1}〉
〈c e′ ∪ {c2}〉

 if cm ∈ e
{〈c e〉} otherwise.
(6.4)
c′ , c \ {cm} (6.5)
e′ , e \ {cm} (6.6)
Finally, remove_dep corresponds to undoing an add_dep op-
eration. Adding a dependency 〈· · ·1  e〉 states that e depends
on all of · · ·1 and therefore every dependency containing · · ·1
is rewritten to preserve Monotonicity. Removing a dependency
〈· · ·1  e〉 states that e is independent of all components in
· · ·1, so every dependency whose causes are contained in · · ·1
is rewritten.
remove_dep(C,R,D)[_ _] : P(C)→ C→ Prop
remove_dep(C,R,D)[c e] , (C,R,D
′) (7)
where
D′ , {r(〈c′  e′〉) | 〈c′  e′〉 ∈ D} (7.1)
r(〈c′  e′〉) ,
{
〈c′  e′ \ {e}〉 if c′ ⊆ c,
〈c′  e′〉 otherwise.
(7.2)
2) Multi-step Refinements: As with generalizations, let R
be the set of all refinement operations and R∗ be the set of
all sequences of refinements. We abuse notation slightly to
define application of a sequence of refinements using the same
notation: for rs ∈ R∗, JrsK(p) is the result of applying that
sequence of refinements to some system properties p.
3) Refinement as the dual of generalization: Each gener-
alization operation and its corresponding refinement are not
necessarily inverses, as most generalization operations map
several elements of Prop to the same more general system
(i.e., they are not injective). Thus, we do not have that ∀g ∈ G,
if q = JgK(p) then ∃r ∈ R, p = JrK(q). However, we can show
the opposite: if q = JrK(p), then p covers q: there is no r such
that q ⊏ r ⊏ p.
Furthermore, the refinement operations form a dual order to
the order defined by generalization:
Theorem III.2. ∀pr, pg ∈ Prop, pr ⊑ pg if and only if ∃rs ∈
R∗, pr = JrsK(pg).
As such, pr refines pg if pg ⊒ pr, or, equivalently, pr ⊑ pg .
D. The Properties Lattice
To be able to use a Galois connection to relate our notions of
generalization and refinement to MIS models, we must define
Prop as a lattice. As such, we need to define top and bottom
elements of Prop, least upper bounds (or joins), and greatest
lower bounds (meets).5
The top element of Prop is the one-element system with
unconstrained component reliability:
⊤ , ({c},R(c) = 0, {〈c S〉}). (8)
Any other one-element system constrains component reliability
and thus can be generalized to ⊤ by relax_rel. Removing the
one dependency results in a system that does not meet the WF
properties, and no further dependencies can be added without
adding another component. Finally, given p ∈ Prop, we can
show p ⊑ ⊤ by repeatedly merging components in p until
the result has one component, then relaxing that component’s
reliability bound, if necessary.
The bottom element of Prop is a special element which
corresponds to an “overdetermined” system—one where the
constraints are contradictory. We do not concern ourselves
with its representation, but simply define it as the element
⊥ ∈ Prop such that ∀p,⊥ ⊑ p.
5Discussion of meets and joins is omitted for lack of space.
6IV. MIS MODELS
Markov Imbeddable Structure models are one approach
to deriving a system’s reliability from the reliability of its
components. These models consist of states and transitions
between states caused by the failure of components. The
reliability of the system is determined by computing the
probability of the system not reaching the “failed” state after
considering the effect of each component.
This paper considers MIS models where the states are
defined by the components functional in that state; e.g., 1101
corresponds to the state of a 4-component system where
components 1, 2, and 4 are functional and component 3
has failed. Components cannot repair themselves, so every
transition is either from one state to that same state or from
one state to a state with more failed components. The failed
state is absorbing—once the system fails, we are no longer
interested in its behavior.
These transitions are usually represented in the form of tran-
sition probability matrices (TPMs) Ti, one for each component.
As the system always starts in the fully functional state, the
initial state probability vector is Π0 , [1, 0, . . . ]. Another
vector u , [1, . . . , 0] defines which states are considered
functional. The system reliability is given by the product of
the initial state probabilities, the TPMs, and the u vector:
R(S) , ΠT0 ∗ T1 ∗ T2 ∗ · · · ∗ Tn ∗ u (9)
As an example, consider the system with two components
in series where R(c1) = R(c2) = p = 1 − q. The TPM for
both components is given by
T1 = T2 =
(
p q
0 1
)
and the resulting system reliability is
R(S) = ΠT0 ∗ T1 ∗ T2 ∗ u = p
2
A. Abstraction and Concretization
To apply our formalization of refinement and generalization
to MIS models, we need to connect our properties domain
Prop to MIS models. We achieve this by an abstraction
operator which converts system constraints to MIS models and
a concretization operator which derives constraints from MIS
models.
To abstract an MIS model from (C,R,D) ∈ Prop, for
each ci ∈ C let pi = 1 − qi = R(ci) be its reliability and let
Ti be its TPM. Let n = |C| be the number of components
in the system. Then, begin with the initial fully-functional
state 1 · · · 1 . For each dependency 〈ci  e〉 ∈ D, insert a
transition from 1 · · · 1 to 1 · · · 1 with probability pi in Ti and
a transition from 1 · · · 1 to the state where all components
except ci and those in e are functional with probability qi
in Ti. If S ∈ e, then mark that state as “failed”. For each
non-“failed” state added in the previous step, let s be the
components functional in that state and let f = C \ s be the
set of failed components. For each component ci ∈ s, select
the dependency 〈c  e〉 ∈ D where ci ∈ c and c is the
largest set such that c ⊂ f . Insert transitions from s to s
with probability pi and from s to s \ e with probability qi
into Ti. For each component ci ∈ f , insert a transition from
s to s with probability 1 into Ti. Repeat this step until there
are no more non-failed states to consider.
Concretizing properties from an MIS model proceeds in an
analogous fashion. For each Ti create a component ci and set
R(ci) = pi. For each ci, first let s
′ be the set of components
functional after ci fails from the initial 1 · · · 1 state and add a
dependency 〈ci  C \ s′〉 to D. Then consider all transitions
in Ti from state s to state s′ where s
′ ⊂ s. Let f , s \ s′ \
{ci} be the set of components that also fail as a result of the
failure of ci. Take 〈c  e〉 ∈ D where ci ∈ c and c is the
largest set such that c ⊂ (C \ s). If e 6= f , add a dependency
〈C \ s \ {ci} f〉.
B. Examples
As an example of the power of this approach, let us refine
a 2-of-3 system from ⊤. Our starting system is
⊤ = ({c1},R(c1) = 0, {〈c1  S〉}).
If we refine c1’s reliability to p by s1 = tighten_rel⊤[c1, p],
the resulting system has reliability R(S) = p.
First, we create another component via s2 = splits1 [c1 →
c1, c2], we get the following system:
s2 = ({c1, c2},R(c1) = R(c2) = p, {
〈c1  c2,S〉, 〈c2  c1,S〉
〈c1, c2  S〉
})
This gives R(S) = p2 as we now take two steps through the
Markov chain.
We can avoid adding excessive dependencies later by remov-
ing two, making c1 independent: s3 = remove_deps2 [c1  
c2,S].
s3 = ({c1, c2},R(c1) = R(c2) = p, {
〈c1  ∅〉, 〈c2  c1,S〉
〈c1, c2  S〉
})
Removing these dependencies adds a new state to the Markov
chain:
11
01
00c1, c2 : p
c2 : q
c1 : q
c1 : 1
c2 : p
c2 : q
c1, c2 : 1
This gives R(S) = p2 + pq—either both components remain
functional, or c1 fails and c2 remains functional.
Next, we introduce c3 by s4 = splits3 [c2 → c2, c3].
s4 = ({c1, c2, c3},R(c1) = R(c2) = R(c3) = p, {
〈c1  ∅〉, 〈c2  c1, c3,S〉, 〈c3  c1, c2,S〉
〈c1, c2  S〉, 〈c1, c3  c2,S〉, 〈c2, c3  c1,S〉
})
7The Markov chain is similar to the one abstracted from s3,
but c3 adds its own transition probabilities. This gives R(S) =
p3+p2q—either all components remain functional, or c1 fails
and c2 and c3 remain functional.
Finally, we arrive at the desired 2-of-3 system by removing
unneeded dependencies: s5 = remove_deps4 [c2  c1, c3,S]
and s6 = remove_deps5 [c3  c1, c2,S].
s6 = ({c1, c2, c3},R(c1) = R(c2) = R(c3) = p, {
〈c1  ∅〉, 〈c2  ∅〉, 〈c3  ∅〉
〈c1, c2  S〉, 〈c1, c3  c2,S〉, 〈c2, c3  c1,S〉
})
The abstracted Markov chain has two new states:
101
111 110
011 000
c1, c2, c3 : p
c1 : q
c2 : q
c3 : q c1, c2 : p
c3 : 1
c1, c2 : q
c1, c3 : p
c2 : 1
c1, c3 : q
c1 : 1
c2, c3 : p c2, c3 : q
1
This gives R(S) = p3 + 3p2q—either all components remain
functional, or only one fails.
V. RELATED WORK
Markov chains form the theoretical basis for numerous
system reliability analyses. Of particular relevance to this
work are two applications of MIS modeling to smart grids—
power grids augmented with cyber monitoring and control
capabilities to improve their dependability [3], [4]. These
studies demonstrate how MIS modeling can be applied to real-
world systems to capture system reliability and component
interdependencies.
Refinement of specifications for software programs has been
studied extensively; see [5] for an introduction and [6] for
a recent survey of the literature. The essence of program
specification and refinement is augmenting a programming
language with a specification language. Thus, programs be-
come specifications that are executable. To derive programs
from non-executable specifications, a refinement relation is de-
fined and various refinements of specifications are developed.
This allows one to start with a high-level specification of a
program’s behavior and derive, through repeated refinement,
an executable program whose specification refines the initial
specification.
Research on refinement of Markov chains has taken two
forms. The first focuses on Interval Markov Chains (IMCs) and
their extension, Constraint Markov Chains (CMCs) [7], [8]. In
these formalisms, transition probabilities are not given exactly,
but are bounded within an interval or given by algebraic
constraints, respectively. As each IMC or CMC corresponds
to a collection of Markov chains that satisfy the requirements
given, it is possible to define refinement directly in terms
of these formalisms, rather than using a separate “system
constraints” formalism, as we do. Each system specification
can be written as an IMC or CMC and then refined into
a complete system model via refinement and conjunction
operations.
The second approach uses counterexample generation to
validate Markov chain abstractions used in model checking [9].
Starting with a coarse approximation of the original Markov
chain, model checking is performed until a counterexample
is found. This counterexample is checked against the orig-
inal specification; if the counterexample does not hold, the
approximate system is refined so the counterexample no longer
holds. This process repeats until a genuine counterexample is
found (one that holds for the original specification) or the
model checking algorithm cannot find a counterexample. A
related work [10] bounds the uncertainty introduced by this
approach to state-space reduction by separately modeling the
uncertainty present in the model and the uncertainty added
through abstraction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed and demonstrated an
approach to refinement and generalization of MIS reliability
models. Key to this approach is a system constraints domain,
which captures the behavior of a system in an abstract,
easily manipulated fashion. These constraints describe the
components of the system, their reliability, and dependencies
that describe how one set of component failures can trigger
another. Given these constraints, we create generalization and
refinement operators that allow us to relax or add constraints as
needed. Thus, we can simplify a system for easier evaluation
by generalizing it or we can iteratively develop one through
repeated refinement. Finally, we link these constraints to MIS
reliability models, enabling us to refine or generalize models
of a common modeling formalism.
We plan to extend the refinement framework to other model-
ing formalisms and to define higher-level modeling operations,
e.g., model composition, in terms of refinement. Furthermore,
we intend to implement this as a software tool so that it can
be easily applied to large-scale systems.
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